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Abstract
Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank
for the determination of workers’ wellbeing, this paper introduces status seek-
ing preferences in the form of rank-dependent utility functions into a moral
hazard framework with one firm and multiple workers, but no correlation in
production. Workers’ concern for the rank of their wage in the firm’s wage
distribution may induce the firm to offer discriminatory wage contracts when
its aim is to induce all workers to expend effort.
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‘...to understand what makes workers satisfied it is necessary to look at
the distribution of wages inside a workplace. We show that rank matters to
people. They care about where their remuneration lies within the hierarchy
of rewards in their office or factory. They want, in itself, to be high up the
pay ordering.’
Brown et al. (2003, p. 30)
1 Introduction
There is a wealth of experimental and empirical work that attests to the fact that
workers in an organisation care about their position among peers –one recent ex-
ample is Brown et al. (2003) which provides empirical and experimental evidence
on the importance of rank.1 Yet many of the theoretical results in the literature on
optimal incentives in organisations assume completely self interested workers. The
question of what happens to the nature of optimal contracts when agents can be
other-regarding has only recently started getting attention.2
Itoh (2004) examines moral hazard in incentive contracts when workers have other-
regarding preferences, but the analysis is restricted to interdependent and symmetric
contracts only. Neilson and Stowe (2004) studies optimal linear contracts for workers
with other-regarding preferences. Both sets of authors follow Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) in modelling other-regarding preferences. The utility functions allow for both
inequality aversion and status seeking (e.g Itoh (2004), Neilson and Stowe (2004)).
In contrast, this paper investigates the case of workers who are status-seeking, in the
sense that they care about their rank3 in the reference group. The focus is on the
question of optimal wage contracts in a simple setting of moral hazard with identical
status-seeking agents. For simplicity, this work follows the literature in making the
assumption that status derives only from one dimension, i.e. the order of realised
wages despite the awareness (as pointed out by Shubik (1971)) that status is often
multi-dimensional.
There are two distinguishing features in the modelling approach used here. First,
in contrast to the above mentioned studies the firm has the possibility to offer
asymmetric contracts. A priori if the firm is interested in exploiting incentives from
status to reduce its wage cost then not allowing the firm to use asymmetric contracts
seems artificially restrictive. Second, differently from the existing literature on other-
regarding preferences this work does not follow Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in allowing
1Brown et al. (2003) also provide a comprehensive survey of this literature.
2There are some early exceptions like e.g. Frank (1984) who argues that the presence of hetero-
geneous status seeking individuals will lead to wage compression. However he used the framework
of perfectly competitive markets and not contract theory.
3Rank is based on the order of realised wages only.
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wage levels and wage differences to matter to workers. Only ordinal differences are
allowed to matter. This is motivated by two considerations: first there is empirical
evidence (Brown et al. (2003)) that employees really care about rank and not about
the deviation from a certain reference level, and second, these preferences could in
principle be generalised to the case of more than two workers4. Indeed, making
preferences depend on the whole vector of wages (rather than the order) when there
are many co-workers in the reference group requires a lot of information on the part
of the worker and seems to require strong assumptions about the specific way in
which the wages of co-workers enters the utility function.
Shubik (1971) on the other hand had in mind a much simpler notion of status games.
In the conversion from a two player game to a game of status the set of outcomes
reduces to essentially three: Win, Lose or Draw. The natural extension of this to
many players suggests that what matters is the number of people below, above or
at the same rank. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004) introduce exactly such a utility
function for status seeking students. In other words, rank seems to us to be a
more robust way to generalise how wage differences matter in the sense that it is
an ordinal measure of status and does not require very precise information on the
wage distribution5. Motivated both by an interest in exploring the role of rank as an
indicator of status and the simple and general way in which Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2004) allow status to matter through ranks, a modification of their model of status
seeking is used.
The main contribution of this work is to show that when agents are conscious about
their rank, then under certain conditions the firm finds it worthwhile to use discrim-
inatory contracts. This is a surprising result: the firm offers different wage contracts
to agents who are ex-ante identical! Such asymmetric contracts can be justified by
having, say, higher probabilities of firing workers who benefit from higher expected
status6.
Also, consistent with the literature, it is found that when agents are status-seeking,
there is wage compression. Finally, it is shown that looking for an optimal contract
in this framework involves two steps: designing the game of status that maximises
incentives (which then implies a given order of wages between the two workers)
and if possible finding the wage levels that satisfy the participation and incentive
constraints.
Winter (2004) shows that in an environment of complementarities in production
4It is conjectured that the results presented here generalise for more than 2 workers if there is
sufficient richness in the distribution of the stochastic shocks.
5It might be argued of course that small changes in wage distribution lead to discontinuous
changes in rank, but, in principle, some perceptions of changes in rank could be added so that
wages would have to change by a significant amount for rank to change. This point is also addressed
in the Conclusion.
6We are grateful to Debraj Ray for this remark.
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and unobservable efforts, optimal mechanisms may be fully discriminating, i.e. they
require unequal treatment of equals. The driving force in his story is the coordination
problems between multiple agents. The more general point of his model is that when
peer effects are important more “hierarchy” in organisations should be observed
when this hierarchy is not related to different job descriptions. Agents in his model
are complementary in production and generate externalities on each other in the
sense that the profitability of their own effort level is increasing in the effort of
others.
There is no reason why such externalities are generated only when workers are re-
lated in production. This paper considers the role of status seeking agents in an
environment where effort is not always observable. Status seeking has similar prop-
erties as complementarities in production: i.e. the effort that agents put in imposes
an externality on other agents. If other agents put in effort then the expected gain
from putting in effort for an individual worker increases.
2 The Model
In this section a model of moral hazard is built with n agents who are status seek-
ing. The model is standard, apart from the utility functions of workers. The general
model with n workers is presented first and then afterwards the discussion is spe-
cialised to the main case studied in this paper: that of n = 2 workers.
2.1 Workers
There are n identical workers who have the choice between two different effort Levels
ei = {eL, eH} where eH > eL. A worker’s cost of a certain chosen effort level is
assumed to be equal to ci(ei), which is assumed to be increasing and convex.
Worker i’s utility depends on the firm’s realised wage distribution w = [w1, w2] and
the cost of providing effort level ei:
Ui(w, ei) = U(w)− c(ei).
Given n and any realised wage distribution w, Worker i’s rank is defined as
ri(w) ≡ #j + γ#k − α#l
n− 1 (1)
where #j (respectively #l) is the number of workers that receive a strictly lower
(respectively higher) wage than Worker i, and #k is the number of workers that
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receive the same wage as Worker i, excluding worker i. Furthermore γ and α are
scalars between zero and one, γ, α ∈ [0; 1]. This is a modification of the status model
in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004): they take rank to be the number of people below
minus the number above. Thus γ = 0 and α = 1 in their model7. Such preferences
will be called rank dependent. Note, Worker i’s Rank is not differentiable in any of
the workers’ wages.
Assume that Worker i’s utility from a realised wage distribution w depends both
on the magnitude of the wage he receives as a consequence of w and his rank in the
firm’s wage distribution ri(w), i.e.
U(w) = wi + βρ (ri(w)) , with ρ
′(·) > 0,
where β ≥ 0.
Given that the number of workers n is fixed, Worker i’s direct utility from his rank
ri, ρ(ri), is assumed to be
ρ (ri(w)) ≡ ri(n− 1)ρˆ,
where ρˆ > 0. This implies that Worker i obtains a direct utility of ρˆ > 0 for
each worker who receives a realised wage that is strictly smaller than his own wage.
Furthermore, for each worker who receives the same wage as Worker i, he receives
a utility of γρˆ and for each worker who is above him he receives −αρˆ. This allows
for the fact that there is clear empirical evidence that individuals prefer to have
a high rank, but there are no clear guidelines yet from the empirical literature for
how individuals feel about those who have the same rank as themselves in such a
hierarchical framework. For ease of analysis define ρ˜ ≡ γρˆ, and ρ′ ≡ αρˆ. Then
Worker i’s direct utility from his rank ρ(ri) can be expressed as
ρ (ri) = (#j)ρˆ+ (#k)ρ˜− (#l)ρ′ (2)
Having presented the general model for rank dependence for n workers, now the
discussion is specialised to the main case discussed in this paper: that of n = 2
workers. It is assumed that there are two effort levels and two states of nature.
Hence, let w = [w1,w2]. The rank dependent Utility function is:
U(w) = wi + βρˆ, if wi > wj
U(w) = wi + βρ˜, if wi = wj
U(w) = wi − βρ′, if wi < wj (3)
where β ≥ 0, ρˆ ≥ ρ˜, ρ′ ≥ 0.
7Shubik (1971) uses a similar utility function for games of status. He also points out the problem
in assigning points for handling ties.
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Next, the following definition about workers’ preferences with respect to the direct
utility derived from their rank is made.
Definition: Convex preferences on status are those which satisfy ρˆ− ρ˜ > ρ˜+ρ′,
i.e.
ρˆ− ρ′ > 2ρ˜.
Concave preferences on status are those which satisfy ρˆ− ρ˜ < ρ˜+ ρ′, i.e.
ρˆ− ρ′ < 2ρ˜.
Note that if lotteries over contracts are allowed, then convexity (concavity) of pref-
erences over status means that a 50-50 lottery over a contract that puts the agent
ahead all the time and a contract that puts the agent behind all the time is (not)
preferred to a contract that puts him equal for sure all the time.
Also, ci(ei) = c¯e
l
i where l = L,H. The workers’ choices of effort level is simplified
to either exerting effort (eH ≡ 1) or not (eL ≡ 0). It is assumed that a worker
who rejects the firm’s offered contract and therefore does not enter the employment
relationship receives a fixed income of zero. Following Neilson and Stowe (2004,
p. 10), the natural assumption is made that if a worker is not in an employment
relationship then he does not compare his income to that of other workers, and hence
the rank dependent component of the utility function is irrelevant. This implies that
Worker i’s reservation utility, U¯ , is normalised to zero.
Finally, it will be assumed that the utility from rank is bounded
Assumption 1. The degree to which Worker i cares about rank is bounded from
above such that
β <
c¯
ρˆ+ ρ′
.
This assumption is made to rule out situations where a worker derives all his utility
from status so that he will be ready to work for next to nothing as long as he has
status8.
2.2 Technology and Output
There are two different states of nature. Each state of nature is characterised by
a different level of output. More specifically the output levels in the two states of
8This seems to be the situation in British universities which seem to take full advantage of their
status seeking academics to pay them a pittance.
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nature s = H,L are such that yH > yL. Sometimes the adjectives good, and bad
are used to refer to the different states of nature. No correlation in agents shocks
nor any technological link between them is allowed. These assumptions are made
to focus on the case when there are no externalities between agents except those
induced by status.
Assume the technology describing the stochastic relationship between effort and
output is such that if ei = e
H then with probability pHs > 0 output is yi = y
s
where s = L,H. However, if Worker i chooses effort level eL instead, then with
probability pLs > 0 output is equal to yi = y
s where s = L,H. Thus yi depends
only on the effort level chosen by Worker i and the assumed technology describing
the relationship between ei and yi, but not on the effort level chosen by Worker j
where j, i = 1, 2 with j 6= i. Additionally, for readability define ∆ps ≡ pHs− pLs for
s = L,H. Finally, throughout the remainder of this paper the following assumption
is made about the technology describing the stochastic relationship between effort
and output.
Assumption 2. The technology is such that the distribution of output if a worker
expends effort first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of output if a
worker expends no effort such that
pHL < pLL and pHH > pLH .
2.3 The Firm
The firm possesses n = 2 identical production facilities i = 1, 2, called factories.
Each factory employs exactly one worker. It is assumed that Worker 1 is employed
at Factory 1 and Worker 2 at Factory 2. This interpretation of the two workers is
made to simplify exposition, so that it can be referred to the two factories without
confusion. It should not be taken too literally: any two workers in the firm who are
not related through production would suffice for the model presented here.
Assuming that the firm is risk-neutral, the firm’s choice problem is to choose a profile
of wage contracts ω and a profile of effort levels e which maximise its expected
combined profit Π from Factory 1 and 2:
max
w(y1,y2),e∈{(e1,e2)|ei∈{eL,eH} }
∑
i
∑
s
[
plsi (y
s
i − wi (w))
]
(4)
where plsi denotes the probability of getting the outcome s when effort e
l, l = L,H
is exerted.
The constraints for the firm are:
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– the workers’ individual rationality constraints
E (Ui(w(y1, y2), e)) ≥ U¯ = 0,
– the workers’ limited liability constraints, i.e. for i = 1, 2
wi(w) ≥ 0, (5)
where wi(w) is the wage paid to Worker i when the firm observes output y1 and
y2 as specified by the wage contract w. There are also incentive constraints for the
firm which however depend on which effort level is desired for each worker.
The above profit-maximisation problem of the firm is equivalent to the following
two-stage problem:
(i) For given effort levels, e1 and e2, the firm minimises its expected wage cost
EWC.
(ii) The firm maximises expected profit Π by comparing the different outcomes of
stage (i) with each other.
In this paper, the focus is on the minimisation of the firm’s expected wage cost
EWC. To be able to ignore Stage (ii) throughout the remainder of this paper the
following assumption is made.
Assumption 3. In terms of the minimisation of its expected wage cost EWC it is
optimal for the firm to induce both workers to expend effort.
2.4 The Wage Contracts
In principle many different feasible sets of contracts could be distinguished. The
most general set is the set of dependent and asymmetric contracts, where wages can
be conditioned on the outcome in both factories and in addition on the identity of
workers.
For the two worker case there is a convenient representation:
H L
H (wHH1 , w
HH
2 ) (w
HL
1 , w
HL
2 )
L (wLH1 , w
LH
2 ) (w
LL
1 , w
LL
2 )
The matrix denotes the four possible events s1× s2 where si (i = 1, 2) is the state of
nature corresponding to Factory i and worker i. Note, whenever this representation
9
is used worker 1 is the column worker and worker 2 is the row worker. A contract is
called dependent if wages depend on the output levels in both factories. Thus wages
are a vector wmi where
m ∈ SD = {(H,H), (H,L), (L,H), (H,H)}.
A contract is also dependent and symmetric if wkhi = w
hk
j where k represents the
random shock to worker i and h to worker j .
A contract is independent if wkhi = w
k
i , i.e. the wages of i are independent of the
shock to worker j. Thus wages of worker i are a vector wmi where m ∈ SI =
{(H), (L)}. Finally a contract is independent and symmetric if wki = wkj .
3 Complete Information
As a starting point in accordance with Laffont and Martimort (2002, p. 151) “... as-
sume that the principal and a benevolent court of law can both observe effort. This
variable is now verifiable and can thus be included into a contract enforced by the
court of law.” In the following two cases are distinguished. First, the standard com-
plete information problem with rank-independent preferences (β = 0) is presented
for completeness. Then, secondly, the case with rank-dependent preferences (β > 0)
is studied. The optimal contract when effort is verifiable and hence contractible is
described for the case when workers have rank-dependent preferences.
3.1 The Benchmark Complete-Information Problem
If Worker i’s (i = 1, 2) preferences are rank-independent, or in other words if β = 0
then the whole economic problem degenerates to the standard complete information
problem. For each worker individually the firm has to find a wage contract which
maximises its expected profit or equivalently minimises its expected wage cost, and
makes the individual worker expend effort.
If workers are not status seeking and hence have no externalities on each other, the
two workers problem is clearly separable in each of them and there is no use in having
dependent or asymmetric contracts. hence only worker i’s problem is dicussed.
If Worker i expends effort, his participation or individual rationality constraint is
equal to ∑
m
pHmwm − c¯ ≥ 0, (6)
with m ∈ SI . The complete information optimal contract wCI solves the following
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problem
min
w
∑
m
pHmwm subject to
∑
m
pHmwm − c¯ ≥ 0 and wm ≥ 0. (7)
This is what the next proposition, a standard result in this field shows.
From (7) it is immediately obvious that there is no unique complete information
optimal contract. Instead there is an infinite number of contracts that solve this
optimization problem. Any wage contract with wm ≥ 0 such that the individual
rationality constraint (6) is binding is a complete information optimal contract.
The following proposition summarises this standard result of contract theory (see
for instance Laffont and Martimort (2002)).
Proposition 1. (Laffont and Martimort (2002)). Let workers’ preferences be rank-
independent. Given the assumption of complete information, any wage contract wCI
with wm ≥ 0 such that
EWCi
(
wCI
)
= c¯
is a complete information optimal contract. The first-best cost of implementing
the high effort level eH = 1 is
CFBi = EWCi
(
wCI
)
= c¯.
Thus, any wage contract that leads to a minimum wage cost equal to c¯ and offers
a positive wage in each state of nature is an optimal wage contract. All optimal
contracts howver give the same expected wage cost.
This implies for the model with two workers in two different factories that the firm
might offer different wage contracts to different workers, but it would not improve
the firm’s cost structure. The firm’s minimum wage cost is always 2c¯.
3.2 Rank-Dependence and Complete Information
What happens to this standard result once rank-dependence is introduced? Now
the choice between independent and dependent contracts, or between symmetric
and asymmetric contracts is not so trivial.
The most general contract is the asymmetric dependent one. Thus wages are a
vector wmi with m ∈ SD. Let qm denote the joint probability of event m given that
both workers expend effort. Thus qm = pHs1pHs2 were m = s1s2.
Given that effort is verifiable, the principal’s problem is
min
w
EWC =
∑
i
∑
m
[qmwmi ]
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subject to the limited liability constraint (5) and the participation constraints∑
m
qmwmi ≥ c¯− βE (ρ(ri)|w) , (8)
where E (ρ(ri)|w) is the expected utility from status, and it is equal to
E (ρ(ri)|w) = qmρ(ri(wmi , wmj )) (9)
First symmetric and independent contracts are examined as they are easy to char-
acterise. It is then shown that no symmetric contract, even if it is dependent can do
better. Finally, a characterisation of the optimal asymmetric independent contract
is provided and it is shown that no dependent asymmetric contract can do better. It
can be concluded that when effort is observable, and agents have convex preferences
on status, then asymmetric contracts dominate symmetric contracts.
Let m ∈ SI . The principal’s problem is
min
w
EWC = 2
∑
m
pHmwm
subject to the limited liability constraint (5) and the participation constraint
∑
m
pHmwm ≥ c¯− βE (ρ(ri)|w) , (10)
where
E(ρ(ri)|w) = pHH [pHHρ(ri(
(
wHi , w
H
j
)
)) +
(
1− pHH) ρ(ri(wHi , wLj ))]
+
(
1− pHH) [(pHH(ρ(ri (wLi , wHj ))) + (1− pHH) (ρ(ri (wLi wLj ))))]
Note, given that the firm offers symmetric contracts the two workers have the same
participation constraint.
Lemma 1. In the case of independent and symmetric contracts if preferences on
status are convex, then the expected utilities from status are maximised when wH 6=
wL. If preferences on status are concave then the expected utilities from status are
maximised when wH = wL.
Proof: Observe that symmetry imposes the condition: wk1 = w
k
2 , k ∈ {H,L} Hence
only matrices where the following rank payoff entries are already chosen can be
considered:
H L
H (ρ˜, ρ˜) (X,Y )
L (Y,X) (ρ˜, ρ˜)
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and X, Y denote the ranks corresponding to the choice of wH > (≤)wL. The ex-
pected utility from status is equal to
E(ρ(ri)|w) = ρ˜
[
[(pHH)2 +
(
1− pHH)2]+ pHH(1− pHH) (X + Y ) .
There are thus two possible choices: the non-egalitarian contract where wH > wL
or vice-versa and in either case the expected utility from status is:
E
(
ρ(ri)|ω 6=
)
= ρ˜
[
(pHH)2 +
(
1− pHH)2]+ pHH(1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ′) . (11)
If it is an egalitarian contract then wH = wL and the expected utility from status is
E (ρ(ri)|ω=) = ρ˜.
It is then obvious that whenever preferences on status are convex then the expected
utility from status of the workers is higher with the non-egalitarian contract and
vice versa when preferences on status are concave.

Hence expected minimum costs should be expected to be lower with the non-
egalitarian contract when preferences on status are convex. The next proposition
shows that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 2. Assume 0 < pHH < 1. (i) If workers have convex preferences
on status then with rank-dependent preferences the complete information optimal
symmetric and independent contract possesses a non-egalitarian structure, i.e. wH 6=
wL. Given rank-dependent preferences the expected wage cost of implementing the
high effort level eH = 1 is
EWC
(
wCI |ω 6=) = 2{c¯− βE (ρ(ri)|ω 6=)} , (12)
where
E
(
ρ(ri)|ω 6=
)
= ρ˜
(
(pHH)2 + (1− pHH)2)+ pHH (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ′} .
(ii) If workers have concave preferences on status, then with rank-dependence there
is a unique complete information optimal symmetric and independent contract which
possesses an egalitarian structure,(
wH , wL
)
= (c¯− βρ˜, c¯− βρ˜)
The expected wage cost of implementing the high effort level eH = 1 is
EWC
(
wCI |ω=) = 2 {c¯− βρ˜} .
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Proof: Lemma (1) showed that when preferences on status are convex, the non-
egalitarian contract gives the maximum expected utility from status and when pref-
erences on status are concave, the egalitarian contract gives maximum expected util-
ity from status. Hence costs are minimised as long as wages wH , wL can be found
that satisfy the constraints: wH 6= wL (non-egalitarian contract) and wH = wL
(egalitarian contract). Hence, any wH 6= wL such that
pHHwH+(1−pHH)wL = c¯−β {ρ˜ ((pHH)2 + (1− pHH)2)+ pHH (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ′)}
is a solution to the cost minimising non egalitarian contract. Similarly wH = wL =
(c¯− βρ˜) is a solution to the cost minimising egalitarian contract.

Does the presence of status seeking agents causes wage compression? Wage Compres-
sion in this setting occurs when in the optimal (symmetric independent) contract, the
wage difference wHi −wLi is lower with rank dependent preferences than in the bench-
mark case. In the egalitarian contract, wH−wL = 0 while in the non-egalitarian con-
tract, wH −wL = wH = c¯−β {ρ˜ ((pHH)2 + (1− pHH)2)+ pHH (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ′)},
both of which are smaller than wH − wL = c¯, in the standard case.
Such a result is shown e.g. in Neilson and Stowe (2004) for whom the key driving
force that causes wage compression is behindness aversion i.e. changes in payoff
matter more to the worker when he is behind than when he is ahead of co-workers.
In the model presented here, behindness aversion is interpreted as the following:
Starting from a position of equal wages, w, being ahead by an amount x > 0,
generates a utility of ρˆ − ρ˜, while being behind by an amount x > 0 generates a
disutility of ρ˜+ ρ′. Thus a worker is behindness averse iff preferences on status are
concave.
Assume that max(ρ˜,
{
ρ˜
(
(pHH)2 + (1− pHH)2)+ pHH (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ′)}) > 0. Com-
paring the optimal contract with rank dependent preferences and the optimal con-
tract in the benchmark case, the setup presented here leads to a wage compression
result that holds independently of behindness aversion. If preferences on status are
concave, then this wage compression result relies on having a positive utility from
being equal in rank.
The next question is whether the expected costs of the principal could be lowered
even further with dependent and asymmetric contracts. First it is claimed that with
dependent symmetric contracts the firm can do no better than Proposition (2).
To see this note that symmetry imposes the condition that wHH1 = w
HH
2 ,w
LL
1 = w
LL
2
and wHL1 = w
LH
2 , w
LH
1 = w
HL
2 . This leads to the following rank matrix which is the
same as the matrix with symmetric and independent contracts.
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H L
H (ρ˜, ρ˜) (X,Y )
L (Y,X) (ρ˜, ρ˜)
Hence, the minimum feasible expected wage cost cannot be lower than that with
the symmetric independent contracts. Thus dependence by itself does not buy us
any extra degrees of freedom.
Can the firm do better with asymmetric dependent contracts? It is shown that while
asymmetry is crucial, dependence does not matter. The firm can do no better with
a dependent contract than with an independent asymmetric one. The way this is
shown is to consider the optimal asymmetric independent contract and show that
this achieves the lowest possible cost, i.e. it is not possible to achieve costs lower
than this level. The implication is that no dependent contract can do strictly better.
This is shown in the next theorem.
Observe that the game of status is conceptually a strictly competitive game. Hence
giving higher expected status to one worker is at the expense of the other worker
who must then be compensated suitably for lower expected status. It is therefore
not obvious that costs can be lowered by asymmetric contracts. The problem is not
trivial because it has been assumed that status only comes from the order of the
wages– if there was another dimension of status then, of course costs can always
be lowered, since one worker can be given a higher rank but lower wages and vice
versa. However it seems highly implausible that high status workers get paid less
than low status workers.
The expected wage cost of the firm, EWC, depend on both participation constraints:
EWC ≥ 2c¯− β (E(ρ(r1)|w) + E(ρ(r2)|w)) .
Lemma 2. The minimum expected wage cost possible for the firm, EWCmin are
equal to 2c¯ − β(ρˆ − ρ′) if preferences on status are convex and equal to 2 (c¯− βρ˜)
otherwise.
Proof: Observe that total costs of the firm are minimised if E(ρ(r1)|w)+E(ρ(r1)|w)
is maximised. Now,
E(ρ(r1)|w)+E(ρ(r2)|w) = (pHH)2(x1)+ (pHH)(1− pHH)(x2+ x3)+ (1− pHH)2(x4)
(13)
where xi ∈ {ρˆ−ρ′, 2ρ˜} for i = {1, 2, 3, 4}. It is clear that when preferences on status
are convex x∗i = ρˆ− ρ′ maximises expected utilities from status while if preferences
on status are concave then x∗i = 2ρ˜ maximises expected utilities from status.

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It can now be established that the firm can achieve minimum expected wage cost
EWCmin with independent contracts as long as there exists the possibility that the
firm can use asymmetric contracts. Let
p¯ =
ϕ
2
{√
1 +
4
ϕ
− 1
}
,
where ϕ = 1+ ρ
′
ρˆ+ρ′ . Note, 1 ≤ ϕ ≤ 3/2 given the assumptions made about ρˆ and ρ′
and hence 0 < p¯ < 1.
Theorem 1. With complete information for all, there exists a profile of optimal
independent wage contracts that guarantees minimum expected wage cost EWCmin
for the firm.
When preferences on status are concave the contracts are symmetric and equal to
wH = wL = c¯− βρ˜.
When preferences on status are convex the contracts are asymmetric and equal
to (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j)
w˜i =
{
c¯− β (pHH ρˆ− (1− pHH)ρ′)
pHH
, 0
}
,
and w˜j = {w˜, w˜} where
w˜ = c¯− β ((1− pHH) ρˆ− pHHρ′)
whenever pHH ≤ p¯,
and equal to
w˘i ≡
{
0,
c¯− β ((1− pHH)ρˆ− pHHρ′)
(1− pHH)
}
.
and w˘j = {w˘, w˘} where
w˘ = c¯− β [pHH ρˆ− (1− pHH)ρ′]
whenever pHH ≥ 1− p¯.
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Proof: Suppose preferences on status are concave, then the symmetric independent
contract, wH = wL = (c¯− βρ˜) implements the EWCmin. Note that limited liability
and participation constraints are satisfied since c¯ > βρˆ follows from Assumption 1.
Now suppose preferences on status are convex. Consider firstly the profile of asym-
metric and independent wage contracts ω˜. Observe that given the profile ω˜, EWC =
EWCmin if the order of wages satisfies:
w˜Hi > w˜
H
j
(14)
w˜Lj > w˜
L
i ,
where, remember, w˜j = {w˜, w˜} (since then worker i’s expected rank utility is
E (ρ(ri)|ω˜) = pHH ρˆ−(1−pHH)ρ′ andWorker j’s expected rank utility is E (ρ(rj)|ω˜) =(
1− pHH) ρˆ− pHHρ′).
It is sufficient to show that the profile ω˜ is such that both workers participation
constraints are satisfied and order (14) is satisfied:
Worker i’s participation constraint is
pHHw˜Hi +
(
1− pHH) w˜Li = c¯− β [pHH ρˆ− (1− pHH) ρ′] = E (ρ(ri)|ω˜) ,
and Worker j’s participation constraint is
w˜ = c¯− β [(1− pHH) ρˆ− pHHρ′] = E (ρ(rj)|ω˜) .
Hence, the participation constraints are clearly satisfied given wage profile ω˜.
The order of wages and the limited liability constraints imply that it has to be shown
that w˜Hi > w˜ > w˜
L
i = 0.
Given Assumption 1, pHH ≤ p¯ is a sufficient condition for the first inequality to be
fulfilled:
Note, w˜Hi > w˜ iff
c¯ > β
{[ (
pHH
)2
1− pHH
]
ρˆ+
[
1−
(
pHH
)2
1− pHH
]
(−ρ′)
}
.
Assumption 1 implies that c¯ > β (ρˆ+ ρ′) and hence a sufficient condition for the
above (strict) inequality to be fulfilled is
(ρˆ+ ρ′) ≥
{[ (
pHH
)2
1− pHH
]
ρˆ+
[
1−
(
pHH
)2
1− pHH
]
(−ρ′)
}
.
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However this (weak) inequality is equivalent to
ϕ ≥
[ (
pHH
)2
1− pHH
]
or pHH ≤ ϕ
2
{√
1 +
4
ϕ
− 1
}
= p¯.
The second inequality follows directly from Assumption 1.
Consider secondly the profile of asymmetric and independent wage contracts ω˘.
Observe that given the profile ω˘, EWC = EWCmin if the order of wages satisfies:
w˘Li > w˘
L
j
(15)
w˘Hj > w˘
H
i ,
where, remember, w˘j = {w˘, w˘} (since then Worker i’s expected rank utility is
E (ρ(ri)|w) =
(
1− pHH) ρˆ−pHHρ′. Worker j’s expected rank utility is E (ρ(rj)|w) =
pHH ρˆ− (1− pHH) ρ′.)
It is sufficient to show that the profile ω˘ is such that both workers participation
constraints are satisfied and order (15) is satisfied:
Worker i’s participation constraint is
pHHw˘Hi +
(
1− pHH) w˘Li = c¯− β [(1− pHH) ρˆ− pHHρ′] = E (ρ(ri)|w) ,
and Worker j’s participation constraint is
w˘ = c¯− β [pHH ρˆ− (1− pHH) ρ′] = E (ρ(rj)|w) .
Hence, the participation constraints are clearly satisfied given wage profile ω˘.
The order of wages and the limited liability constraints imply that it has to be shown
that w˘Li > w˘ > w˘
H
i = 0.
Given Assumption 1, pHH ≥ 1− p¯ is a sufficient condition for the first inequality to
be fulfilled:
Note, w˘Li > w˘ iff
c¯ > β
{[(
1− pHH)2
pHH
]
ρˆ+
[
1−
(
1− pHH)2
pHH
]
(−ρ′)
}
.
Assumption 1 implies that c¯ > β (ρˆ+ ρ′) and hence a sufficient condition for the
above (strict) inequality to be fulfilled is
(ρˆ+ ρ′) ≥
{[(
1− pHH)2
pHH
]
ρˆ+
[
1−
(
1− pHH)2
pHH
]
(−ρ′)
}
.
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However this (weak) inequality is equivalent to
ϕ ≥
[(
1− pHH)2
pHH
]
or pHH ≥ 1− ϕ
2
{√
1 +
4
ϕ
− 1
}
= 1− p¯.
The second inequality follows directly from Assumption 1.

The following remark follows from the above theorem.
Remark: With complete information such that effort is verifiable independent con-
tracts allow the firm to achieve whatever it can achieve with dependent asymmetric
contracts as long as it has the ability to choose independent asymmetric contracts.
Notice that, unlike the case of rank independent preferences, it is necessary to con-
dition wages on output and not just effort, in order to achieve minimum cost: the
asymmetric contract cannot be replicated by a deterministic one that is conditioned
only on effort. However, if it is allowed that contracts are stochastic then the
asymmetric contract can be replicated with a symmetric stochastic contract that
is conditioned only on effort. In order to provide the same incentives from status,
consider a contract that gives worker 1 high wages wH > 0, and worker 2 low wages
wL = 0, with probability pHH and vice versa with probability 1− pHH if they both
put in high effort. This contract achieves the minimum cost. Thus, in the case
of observable effort under some conditions the optimal contract is asymmetric and
independent. The intuition behind this result is quite simple – when status and
monetary incentives are substitutes, the firm is able to exploit the order of wages
to create situations where each worker gets utility from status and hence lowers
the expected wage cost. This intuition is easy to see with the stochastic symmetric
contract.
This may seem to be unrealistic to assume: after all if firms started paying workers
according to random events even when effort is fully observed it might cause a loss
of morale. However, the results presented here are consistent with situations where
effort is unobserved but is very weakly correlated with output. This suggests that in
such situations, linking employee compensation differentially to random events (like
changes in the value of the firm’s stocks) might occur since it lowers overall costs to
the firm by creating artificial hierarchies.
Next the situation when effort is unobservable is studied. What matters here is
the expected gain in status when an agent works relative to when he shirks, given
that all others are working. The following section addresses the question of whether
asymmetric contracts can do better than symmetric contracts, even in the moral
hazard setting.
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4 Moral Hazard with Risk Neutral parties
Assume the firm’s aim is to minimise its expected wage cost and to induce both
workers to expend effort, e1 = e2 = 1. If the firm is unable to observe its workers’
actions, i.e. their choice of effort, directly, then the firm can offer only a contract
that is based on the observable and therefore verifiable output levels of the two
factories. However again the firm has the choice between dependent or independent
contracts, and symmetric or asymmetric contracts.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. First, the standard moral-
hazard problem is presented. As in the complete information case when there is
no rank-dependence in utilities, then the two factories problems are separable and
so independent symmetric contracts will do as well as the most general contracts.
So in this section only independent and symmetric contracts are considered. Next,
the moral-hazard problem in an environment of rank-dependent preferences is set
out. In this part independent and dependent contracts are studied. First, the
case of independent contracts is presented distinguishing between symmetric and
asymmetric independent contracts. It is shown that in some circumstances the firm
can improve its situation by offering asymmetric independent contracts, but as long
as the firm is restricted to independent contracts it is unable to achieve minimum
expected wage cost. Second the case of dependent contracts is presented, and again
symmetric and asymmetric contracts are studied. It is shown that the firm cannot
improve its situation by using symmetric dependent contracts. However if the firm
has the ability to use asymmetric dependent contracts, the most general form of
contracts, then it is shown that the firm can achieve minimum expected wage cost.
In this way it is established that workers’ concern for the rank of their wage in
the firm’s wage distribution induces the firm to offer discriminatory wage contracts
when its aim is to induce all workers to expend effort.
4.1 The Benchmark Moral-Hazard Problem
If Worker i’s (i = 1, 2) utility is rank-independent, or in other words if β = 0, then
the whole economic problem degenerates to the standard moral-hazard problem.
For each of its factories, the firm’s strategy is to find a wage contract ωi which
maximises its expected profit or equivalently minimises its expected wage cost, and
makes the individual worker expend effort at Factory i.9
Let m ∈ SI . With incomplete information, i.e. if Worker i’s effort level is not
verifiable, the problem of the firm is to find a wage contract w that minimises
min
w
EWC =
∑
m
pHmwm,
9Therefore in the remainder of this section the subscript i is omitted.
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where EWC represents the expected wage cost at Factory i, subject to the limited
liability constraint (5), and Worker i’s incentive constraint10:
∆pHwH +∆pLwL ≥ c¯
or using the fact that ∆pL = −∆pH
∆pH
[
wH − wL] ≥ c¯. (16)
The following proposition describes the optimal contract for the standard moral-
hazard problem. In its main part it repeats Proposition 1 of Itoh (2004).
Proposition 3. For all m = L,H and risk neutral parties the unique optimal con-
tract solving the standard moral-hazard problem is
wS =
{
wH , wL
}
=
{
c¯
∆pH
, 0
}
,
and the expected cost of implementing effort is
EWCi
(
wS
)
= pHH
(
c¯
∆pH
)
in Factory i. The firm’s overall expected cost of implementing effort is 2EWCi
(
wS
)
.
4.2 Rank-Dependence and Moral Hazard
If effort is no longer observable and verifiable, and workers possess rank-dependent
preferences then the firm’s choice problem changes. Like in the standard moral-
hazard problem the firm has to base its contracts on the observable variable output.
However, with rank-dependent preferences, when offering a wage contract to one
worker the firm has to take into account the likely effects of this contract on the
other worker.
The most general type of contract that can be offered is (as before) the Asymmetric
Dependent one. Let E (wsii ) =
∑
sj∈{H,L} p
Hsj wi(si, sj). Then E
(
wHi
)
represents
worker i’s expected wage when he is in the good state, si = H, given that ej = 1,
and E
(
wLi
)
respectively is worker i’s expected wage when he is in the bad state,
si = L, given that ej = 1 (note, expectation is taken over the other worker’s state
of nature). If Contracts are independent then E (wsii ) = wi(si). Similarily, define
E (ρsii ) =
∑
sj∈{H,L} p
Hsj ρi(ri(w(si, sj)). Then E
(
ρHi
)
represents worker i’s ex-
pected rank payoff when he is in the good state, si = H, given that ej = 1, and
10The individual rationality constraint is implied by the limited liability constraint and the
incentive constraint.
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E
(
ρLi
)
respectively is worker i’s expected rank payoff when he is in the bad state,
si = L, given that ej = 1
The firm’s problem is to find contracts that will be conditioned on workers iden-
tity and the shocks in both factories to induce both workers to exert effort while
minimising its expected wage cost:
min
w
EWC =
∑
i
∑
m
[qmwmi ]
subject to the limited liability constraints, which follow from (5),
wmi ≥ 0,
the (low effort) participation constraints (ei = 0)
pLHE
(
wHi
)
+
(
1− pLH)E (wLi )+ βE (ρ(ri)|eL) ≥ 0, (17)
where E
(
ρi(ri)|eL
)
is worker i’s expected utility from status given ei = 0 and ej = 1,
and the incentive constraints
∆pH
[
E
(
wHi
)− E (wLi )] ≥ c¯− βE (∆ρi) , (18)
where E (∆ρi) is Worker i’s expected gain or loss in expected rank-utility from
expending effort. It is equal to
E (∆ρi) ≡ ∆pH [E
(
ρHi
)− E (ρLi )].
Define worker i’s incentives from status as
Ii = E
(
ρHi
)− E (ρLi ) .
Then these incentives from status can be expressed as
Ii(w) = p
HH{ρ(ri(w(si = H, sj = H)))− ρ(ri(w(si = L, sj = H)))}+
(1− pHH){ρ(ri(w(si = H, sj = L)))− ρ(ri(w(si = L, sj = L)))}.(19)
Using Equation (18), worker i’s incentive constraint can then be written as[
E
(
wHi
)− E (wLi )] ≥ c¯∆pH − βIi(w) (20)
Note, the participation constraints for ei = 1 and ej = 1 can be ignored in this
framework, because they are implied by the (low effort) participation constraints
and the incentive constraints.
The following lemma provides a straightforward characterisation of the minimum
expected wage cost in the case of rank-dependence and moral hazard.
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Lemma 3. Let I∗1 + I
∗
2 be the maximised value of I1 + I2, the sum of the incentives
from status of the two players, across different wage orders. Then, the minimum
expected wage cost possible to the firm, EWCmin, is
EWCmin = pHH
{
2
c¯
∆pH
− β (I∗1 + I∗2 )
}
.
Proof: From Equation (20) Worker i’s incentive constraint is[
E
(
wHi
)− E (wLi )] ≥ c¯∆pH − βIi(w)
for any wage profile ω. The firm’s expected wage cost, EWC, can be written as
EWC =
∑
i
{
pHH
[
E
(
wHi
)− E (wLi )]+ E (wLi )} .
Using these two information for any wage profile ω the following inequality has to
hold
EWC ≥ pHH
{
2
c¯
∆pH
− β (I1 + I2)
}
.
Note, the RHS of the above inequality is minimised iff I1 + I2 is maximised, hence
EWCmin = pHH
{
2
c¯
∆pH
− β (I∗1 + I∗2 ) .
}
.

The minimum feasible cost is achieved when for both workers E
(
wL
)
= 0 and the
sum E
(
wH1
)
+E
(
wH2
)
is just enough to satisfy each of the two incentive constraints.
The next lemma characterises the wage orders that maximise the sum of incentives.
Lemma 4. The rank payoff matrix which maximises I1 + I2 ( the roles of the two
workers can be exchanged and the same sum of incentives is obtained) is given by:
H L
H ρˆ,−ρ′ ρˆ,−ρ′
L −ρ′, ρˆ ρ˜, ρ˜
when preferences on status are convex, and by
H L
H ρ˜, ρ˜ ρˆ,−ρ′
L −ρ′, ρˆ −ρ′, ρˆ
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when preferences on status are concave.
The maximised value of I1 + I2 is equal to
I∗1 + I
∗
2 = p
HH(ρˆ+ ρ′) + 2(1− pHH)(ρˆ− ρ˜)
when preferences on status are convex, and by
I∗1 + I
∗
2 = 2p
HH(ρ˜+ ρ′) + (1− pHH)(ρˆ+ ρ′)
when preferences on status are concave.
Proof:
Step 1: Consider the matrix:
H L
H x1, y1 x2, y2
L x3, y3 x4, y4
The problem is to maximize the following expression, by choice of (xi, yi) pairs:
I1 + I2 = p
HH ((x1 − x3) + (y1 − y2)) +
(
1− pHH) ((x2 − x4) + (y3 − y4)) .
subject to the constraint that (xi, yi) ∈ {(ρˆ,−ρ′); (ρ˜, ρ˜); (−ρ′, ρˆ)}. Notice that it has
to be (x2, y2) = (ρˆ,−ρ′) and (x3, y3) = (−ρ′, ρˆ) since I1 + I2 is increasing in x2, y3
and decreasing in x3, y2.
Hence the rank payoff matrix which maximizes I1 + I2 is of the form:
H L
H x1, y1 ρˆ, ρ
′
L −ρ′, ρˆ x4, y4
Step 2: The various possibilities given Step 1 above are the following (upto sym-
metry between players):
(A) (x1, y1) = (ρˆ,−ρ′), (x4, y4) = (−ρ′, ρˆ), with I1 + I2 = ρˆ+ ρ′
(B) (x1, y1) = (ρˆ,−ρ′), (x4, y4) = (ρ˜, ρ˜) with I1+I2 = pHH(ρˆ+ρ′)+2(1−pHH)(ρˆ−ρ˜).
(C) (x1, y1) = (ρ˜, ρ˜), (x4, y4) = (−ρ′, ρˆ), with I1+I2 = 2pHH(ρ˜+ρ′)+(1−pHH)(ρˆ+ρ′).
(D) (x1, y1) = (ρ˜, ρ˜) (x4, y4) = (ρ˜, ρ˜) with I1+I2 = 2p
HH(ρ˜+ρ′)+2(1−pHH)(ρˆ− ρ˜).
It is easy to see that the matrix which maximizes I1+ I2 is (B) when preferences on
status are convex and (C) when preferences on status are concave.
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The above two lemmas give some characterisation of the minimum feasible cost for
the firm, EWCmin. So far it has not been established that there exists a feasible
wage profile ω with a wage order that creates the corresponding incentives from
status I∗1 and I
∗
2 . Furthermore it has also not been established that given there
exists a wage profile ω that creates the corresponding incentives from status I∗1 and
I∗2 it is such that EWC = EWC
min.
Like in the case with complete information the most general type of wage contract
is an asymmetric dependent one. However, before presenting the case of dependent
contracts and especially asymmetric dependent contracts first independent contracts
are investigated and two questions are answered: Firstly, which independent contract
is minimising the firms expected wage cost, and, secondly, is the firm able to achieve
the minimum expected wage cost EWCmin with the help of an independent contract.
4.2.1 Independent Contracts
Given the restriction on independent contracts, again the firm can choose between
symmetric and asymmetric independent contracts. Initially the focus is on symmet-
ric independent contracts. With symmetric contracts each worker receives the same
contract, i.e. in the following it is assumed
w1 = w2 =
(
wH , wL
)
.
The firm’s problem is to find symmetric contracts that induces both workers to
expend effort and minimises its expected wage cost, i.e.
min
ω
EWC = 2
{
pHHwH +
(
1− pHH)wL}
subject to worker i’s incentive constraint, which follows from (20), and in the case
of symmetric wage contracts can be written as[
wH − wL] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− βIi(wS), (21)
where
Ii(w
S) =
{
pHH (ρ˜− ρ(ri(w(si = L, sj = H))))
+
(
1− pHH) (ρ(ri(w(si = H, sj = L)))− ρ˜) },
and the limited liability constraints, which follow from (5),
wH , wL ≥ 0.
25
Now the order of wages wH , wL has to be found which maximises the incentives of
both workers. The rank payoff matrix has less flexibility now as symmetry imposes
the conditions that wk1 = w
k
2 for k = H,L. The rank payoff matrix is as below with
the only choice being whether to choose wH ≥ wL or vice versa.
H L
H ρ˜, ρ˜ X, Y
L Y,X ρ˜, ρ˜
with X = ρˆ, Y = −ρ′ if wH > wL and X = −ρ′, y = ρˆ if wH < wL. Clearly
incentives are maximised if wH > wL. This is what the next proposition shows.
Let
ρ′
S
=
(
pLH
(
1− pHH) ρˆ+ [pLHpHH + (1− pLH) (1− pHH)] ρ˜
pHH (1− pLH)
)
.
The following proposition characterises the optimal symmetric independent contract
that minimises the firm’s expected wage cost.
Proposition 4. Assume ρ′ ≤ ρ′
S
. The unique optimal symmetric independent wage
contract that minimises the firm’s expected wage cost is
wS∗ ≡ (wH , wL)S∗ = ( c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′) + (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜)} , 0) .
Given the optimal symmetric wage contract, wS∗, the firm’s expected wage cost is
EWCS = 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′) + (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜)}} , (22)
where
EWCS > EWCmin.
Proof: The firm’s expected wage cost can be rewritten as
EWC = 2
{
wL + pHH
[
wH − wL]} .
Using the Workers’ limited liability constraints and incentive constraints, in the case
of symmetric and independent contracts the following condition must hold:
wL + pHH
[
wH − wL] ≥ pHH { c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜− Y ) + (1− pHH) (X − ρ˜)}} ,
where X, Y ∈ {ρˆ, ρ˜,−ρ′} The RHS of this inequality is minimised iff Y = −ρ′ and
X = ρˆ and hence wH > wL. The above condition then becomes
wL + pHH
[
wH − wL] ≥ pHH { c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′) + (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜)}} .
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The LHS and hence the firm’s expected wage cost are minimised but fulfill the
above condition iff wL = 0 and
wH =
c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜− 0) + (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜)} .
In other words, the optimal symmetric wage contract is found by choosing the two
state-dependent wages such that the workers’ incentive constraints are binding and
then setting wL equal to zero. The limited liability constraints are fulfilled given
Assumption 1.
Finally, for wS∗ to be optimal it has to be checked that the (low) participation
constraint of Worker i is fulfilled:
pLHwH +
(
1− pLH)wL + βE (ρ(r)|eL) ≥ 0
where
E
(
ρ(r)|eL) = pLH (1− pHH) ρˆ+[pLHpHH + (1− pLH) (1− pHH)] ρ˜−pHH (1− pLH) ρ′
Given the assumption of ρ′ being sufficiently small, ρ′ ≤ ρ′
S
, Worker i’s participation
constraint is satisfied, because E
(
ρ(r)|eL) ≥ 0.
From wS∗ it follows directly that EWCS > EWCmin.

As with the complete information case, there is a wage compression in this setting as
well: the high wage is smaller than in the benchmark case without rank dependence.
The question now arises: is this the best contract possible or are there as in the
complete information case circumstances under which there exists an asymmetric
contract that does strictly better than the optimal symmetric independent contract?
Next this question is analysed.
After the unique optimal symmetric independent contract has been described above,
the aim is now to answer the question whether the firm can improve its outcome
by offering asymmetric contracts. In other words is there a profile of asymmetric
independent contracts which can make the firm better off than the unique optimal
symmetric contract described in Proposition 4.
Define an order on wages wH1 , w
L
1 , w
H
2 , w
L
2 as a wage structure. Observe that by
Assumption 1 wHi > w
L
i . Hence there are only a limited number of such structures
that are feasible. Surprisingly, in the following it is shown that all but one of the
feasible wage structures that are implied by asymmetric independent contracts lead
to higher wage costs for the firm than the symmetric optimal contract. The next
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Lemma characterises all such wage structures implied by asymmetric independent
contracts. Furthermore it is shown that, as in the case of symmetric independent
contracts, it is not possible to obtain the minimum expected wage cost EWCmin
with asymmetric independent contracts.
Lemma 5. There is no profile of asymmetric independent contracts ωAS such that
the wage structure is either wi
AS  wjAS or wiAS ≥ wjAS or wHi > wHj > wLj > wLi
(i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j) which induces both workers to exert effort and makes the firm
better off than with the optimal symmetric independent contract, i.e. EWC
(
ωAS
)
>
EWSS for all ωAS. Furthermore with asymmetric independent contracts it is im-
possible for the firm to reach EWCmin.
Proof: This proposition deals with four different cases of asymmetric contracts:
Case (i) wHi , w
L
i > w
H
j , w
L
j : Worker i’s incentive constraint is[
wHi − wLi
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH(ρ¯− ρ¯) + (1− pHH) (ρ¯− ρ¯)} ,
or simplified [
wHi − wLi
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
.
Similarly Worker j’s incentive constraint is[
wHi − wLi
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
.
Note, the firm’s expected wage cost is
EWC ≡ {pHHwH1 + (1− pHH)wL1 }+ {pHHwH2 + (1− pHH)wL2 }
= wL1 + p
HH
[
wH1 − wL1
]
+ wL2 + p
HH
[
wH2 − wL2
]
.
The expressions for the two workers’ incentive constraints imply that the following
condition holds for the firm’s expected wage cost:
EWC > 2pHH
c¯
∆pH
.
But this inequality establishes that deviating from the optimal symmetric indepen-
dent contract to such a profile of asymmetric independent contracts is not optimal
for the firm.
The next two wage structures examined here are the ones which maximise the sum
of incentives from status (see Lemma 3 and Lemma 4) and are therefore crucial for
the question whether it is possible for the firm to achieve EWCmin with asymmetric
independent contracts.
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Case (ii) wHi > w
H
j > w
L
i = w
L
j : Worker i’s incentive constraint is[
wHi − wLi
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρˆ+ ρ′) + (1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜)} .
Similarly, Worker j’s incentive constraint is[
wHj − wLj
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− β {(1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜)} .
Given the above described wage structure Worker i’s incentive constraint cannot be
binding, but Worker j’s is. The wage wHi is determined by the fact that w
H
i > w
H
j .
Hence, for the firm’s expected wage cost the following inequality holds:
EWC > 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β {(1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜)}} .
But this inequality establishes that deviating from the optimal symmetric indepen-
dent contract to such a profile of asymmetric independent contracts is not optimal
for the firm.
Case (iii) wHi = w
H
j > w
L
i > w
L
j : Worker i’s incentive constraint is[
wHi − wLi
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′)} .
Similarly, Worker j’s incentive constraint is[
wHj − wLj
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′) + (1− pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′)} .
Given the above described wage structure Worker j’s incentive constraint cannot be
binding, but Worker i’s is. The wage wH is determined by the fact that wLi > w
L
j
and Worker i’s binding incentive constraint. Hence, for the firm’s expected wage
cost the following inequality holds:
EWC > 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β {pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′)}} .
But this inequality establishes that deviating from the optimal symmetric indepen-
dent contract to such a profile of asymmetric independent contracts is not optimal
for the firm.
Furthermore this two cases show that even tough it is possible with asymmetric
independent contracts to maximise the sum of incentives from status, the wage
structures necessary to induce these incentives from status imply that the firm is
unable to obtain EWCmin, because it is not possible given the wage structure and
hence the incentives from status to choose the wages in the different states of nature
in such a way that all of the incentive constraints are binding.
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Case (iv) wHi > w
H
j > w
L
j > w
L
i : Worker i’s incentive constraint is[
wHi − wLi
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− β {ρˆ+ ρ′} .
Similarly, Worker j’s incentive constraint is[
wHj − wLj
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
.
Worker i’s incentive constraint cannot be binding, but Worker j’s is. The wage
wHi is determined by the fact that w
L
j > w
L
i = 0 and Worker j’s binding incentive
constraint. Hence, for the firm’s expected wage cost the following inequality holds:
EWC > 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
}
.
But this inequality establishes that deviating from the optimal symmetric indepen-
dent contract to such a profile of asymmetric independent contracts is not optimal
for the firm and hence completes the proof of the above proposition.

Given this negative result, there is only one possible wage structure left that could
possibly be used to construct an asymmetric independent contract that is better
than the optimal symmetric independent contract. This wage structure is wHi >
wHj > w
L
i > w
L
j (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j).
Let
ρ′
AS
=
(
pLH
(
1− pHH) ρˆ
1− pLH (1− pHH)
)
.
The following proposition describes the minimum expected wage cost with an asym-
metric independent contract with the wage structure described above.
Proposition 5. Assume ρ′ ≤ ρ′
AS
. There exists a profile of asymmetric independent
wage contracts ωAS∗ with a asymmetric implied structure that is strictly increasing
such that (i, j = 1, 2 with j 6= i)
wHi > w
H
j > w
L
i > w
L
j ,
which induces all workers to expend effort and has expected wages costs EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
given as:
If pHH ≤ 1
2
:
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EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
= 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β (ρˆ+ ρ
′)
2
}
+ . (23)
If pHH > 1
2
:
EWC ≥ 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β {1− pHH} (ρˆ+ ρ′)}+  (24)
where  > 0 but equal to the smallest monetary unit.
Proof:
The wage structure implied by ωAS∗ implies that Worker i’s incentive constraint is[
wHi − wLi
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− βpHH (ρˆ+ ρ′) .
Similarly Worker j’s incentive constraint is[
wHj − wLj
] ≥ c¯
∆pH
− β (1− pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) .
From the minimisation of the firm’s expected wage cost it follows that wLj = 0, and
taking into account Worker j’s incentive constraint gives:
wHj =
c¯
∆pH
− β (1− pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) .
Then Worker i’s incentive constraint implies that
wHi ≥
c¯
∆pH
− βpHH (ρˆ+ ρ′) + wLi .
The condition wHi > w
H
j implies that
wHi >
c¯
∆pH
− β (1− pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) .
Hence Worker i’s incentive constraint is (not) binding iff
β
(
1− 2pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) + wLi > (<)0,
or
wLi > (<)− β
(
1− 2pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) . (25)
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Firstly, let pHH ≤ 1/2, then the limited liability constraint implies that condition
(25) is irrelevant because the RHS is negative. Hence, to minimise its expected
wage cost the firm sets wLi =  > 0 but equal to the smallest monetary unit. From
the cost minimisation and Worker i’s incentive constraint it follows that
wHi =
c¯
∆pH
− βpHH (ρˆ+ ρ′) + .
This implies the profile of asymmetric wage contracts minimising the firm’s expected
wage cost ωAS∗ =
((
wHi , w
L
i
)
,
(
wHj , w
L
j
))
is
ωAS∗ =
((
c¯
∆pH
− βpHH (ρˆ+ ρ′) + , 
)
,
(
c¯
∆pH
− β (1− pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) , 0))
For pHH ≤ 1/2, the firm’s minimum expected wage cost is
EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
= 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β (ρˆ+ ρ
′)
2
}
+ .
Secondly, let pHH > 1/2, then the RHS of condition (25) is strictly positive. Now,
it is crucial wether the smallest monetary unit fulfills (25) or not. Suppose not, i.e.
 < −β (1− 2pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) .
Then, it follows from the minimisation of the expected wage cost that wLi =  and
wHi is set such that w
H
i > w
H
j . Note, Worker i’s incentive constraint is not binding
in this case, hence
wHi = w
H
j +  =
c¯
∆pH
− β (1− pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) + .
The firm’s expected wage cost EWC is then:
EWC = 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β {1− pHH} (ρˆ+ ρ′)}+ 
Suppose next that the smallest monetary unit is such that
 ≥ −β (1− 2pHH) (ρˆ+ ρ′) .
Then, it follows from the minimisation of the expected wage cost that wLi =  and
wHi is set such that Worker i’s incentive constraint is binding in this case, hence
wHi =
c¯
∆pH
− βpHH (ρˆ+ ρ′) + .
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The firm’s expected wage cost EWC is then:
EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
= 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β (ρˆ+ ρ
′)
2
}
+ .
Note, with pHH > 1/2
EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
> EWC = 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β {1− pHH} ρˆ}+ .
Note, given Assumption 1 the limited liability constraints are fulfilled. To complete
this proof it has to be checked whether the wage contracts specified above by the
wage profile ωAS∗ fulfill the (low) participation constraints.
Worker i’s (low effort) participation constraint is given by
pLHwHi +
(
1− pLH)wLi + βE (ρ(ri)|eL) ≥ 0,
where
E
(
ρ(ri)|eL
)
=
(
pLH +
(
1− pLH) (1− pLH)) ρˆ+ (1− pLH) (−ρ′).
Worker j’s (low effort) participation constraint is given by
pLHwHj +
(
1− pLH)wLj + βE (ρ(rj)|eL) ≥ 0,
where
E
(
ρ(rj)|eL
)
= pLH
(
1− pHH) ρˆ+ (pLHpHH + (1− pLH)) (−ρ′).
Given the assumption of ρ′ being sufficiently small, ρ′ ≤ ρ′
AS
, both workers’ partici-
pation constraints are satisfied, because E
(
ρ(ri)|eL
) ≥ 0 and E (ρ(rj)|eL) ≥ 0.
Note, E
(
ρ(ri)|eL
) ≥ 0 iff
ρ′ ≤
((
1− pHH (1− pLH)) ρˆ
pHH (1− pLH)
)
,
and E
(
ρ(rj)|eL
) ≥ 0 iff
ρ′ ≤
(
pLH
(
1− pHH) ρˆ
1− pLH (1− pHH)
)
,
where ((
1− pHH (1− pLH)) ρˆ
pHH (1− pLH)
)
>
(
pLH
(
1− pHH) ρˆ
1− pLH (1− pHH)
)
= ρ′
AS
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Note, ρ′
AS
< ρ′
S
. The following theorem establishes the conditions under which a
profile of asymmetric independent contracts does strictly better than the optimal
symmetric independent contract.
Theorem 2. Assume ρ′ ≤ ρ′
AS
. Let pHH < 1/2, then if Worker i’s preferences on
status are concave, i.e.
ρˆ− ρ′ < 2ρ˜,
then there exists an ¯ ≡ βpHH [1− 2pHH] [2ρ˜− (ρˆ− ρ′)] , such that if  < ¯, then
EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
< EWC
(
ωS∗
)
,
and hence it is optimal for the firm to switch from the profile of symmetric indepen-
dent contracts ωS∗ to the profile of asymmetric independent contracts ωAS∗.
Proof: From Proposition (5) the EWC function with asymmetric contracts is
known: If pHH > 1
2
, then EWC is described by the condition
EWC ≥ 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β {1− pHH} (ρˆ+ ρ′)}+  > EWCS.
Hence with pHH > 1/2 it is not profitable for the firm to deviate from its optimal
symmetric independent contract to this profile of asymmetric independent wage
contracts.
Secondly, let pHH ≤ 1/2, then
EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
= 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β (ρˆ+ ρ
′)
2
}
+ .
EWC
(
ωAS∗
)
< EWCS iff
2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β (ρˆ+ ρ
′)
2
}
+ < 2pHH
{
c¯
∆pH
− β [(1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜) + pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′)]}
or simplified
 < βpHH
[
1− 2pHH] [2ρ˜− (ρˆ− ρ′)] = ¯.
If pHH < 1/2, then the RHS of this inequality is strictly positive iff
2ρ˜ > ρˆ− ρ′,
completing the proof of the above theorem.
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The intuition behind this result is as follows. Starting from symmetric indepen-
dent contracts can the firm do better by switching to an asymmetric independent
contract? With the optimal asymmetric independent contract one worker has al-
ways higher expected status. For ease of exposition it is assumed this is Worker 1.
However what is crucial for the firm is not the expected status of a worker, but the
incentives from status. Depending on the parameters it can be either Worker 1 or
Worker 2 whose incentives from status increase after the switch to an asymmetric
contract. If it is Worker 1 who gains in terms of incentives at the expense of Worker
2 then the firm cannot profit from a switch to an asymmetric contract, because it
is the wages of Worker 2 that provide a lower bound for the wages of Worker 1.
However note that this lower bound increases due to the switch. Thus, it is only in
the case where Worker 2 gains in terms of incentives from status that the firm can
benefit from switching to an asymmetric contract. Theorem 2 provides the condi-
tions under which it is indeed Worker 2 who gains in incentives from status while
Worker 1 gains in terms of the expected status.
Therefore under some circumstances it might be profitable for the firm to switch
from symmetric independent contracts to the asymmetric independent contracts
described above. However, if the firm use of contracts is restricted to independent
contracts then it is impossible to reach minimum expected wage cost EWCmin. With
asymmetric independent contracts there exists a profile of wage contracts that max-
imises both workers’ incentives from status. However the framework of asymmetric
independent contracts is to narrow to obtain EWCmin, because given the maximised
sum of incentives from status the profile of asymmetric independent contracts cannot
be chosen in such a way that both incentive constraints are simultaneously binding
given I∗1 and I
∗
2 . Next section finally addresses the question whether it is possible
for the firm to reach EWCmin with the help of dependent contracts.
4.2.2 Dependent Contracts
If the firm is not restricted to independent contracts then the firm is able to choose
between two different types of dependent contracts: symmetric dependent and asym-
metric dependent contracts. The second type of contract is the most general type
of contract. The question is whether these more general contracts help the firm to
reduce its expected wage cost. In the previous section the minimum expected wage
cost given the restriction to independent contracts have been established, but it has
been shown, too, that with independent contracts alone the firm is unable to obtain
the minimum expected wage cost EWCmin.
With rank-dependent preferences in a moral-hazard environment symmetric depen-
dent contracts do not help the firm to achieve lower expected wage cost. Recall from
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the previous section that
ρ′
S
=
(
pLH
(
1− pHH) ρˆ+ [pLHpHH + (1− pLH) (1− pHH)] ρ˜
pHH (1− pLH)
)
.
The following proposition establishes that the firm can not improve its situation in
terms of its expected wage cost with symmetric dependent contracts, because it can
achieve the same level of expected wage cost with symmetric independent contracts.
Proposition 6. Let m ∈ SD and i = 1, 2. Suppose that the cost minimising optimal
Symmetric Dependent (SD) contract is given by wSD
∗
, where
wSD
∗
= (w∗(si = H, sj = H), w∗(si = H, sj = L)), w∗(si = L, sj = H)), w∗(si = L, sj = L))
The principal can achieve the same expected cost by a Symmetric Independent (SI)
contract with wages
wHi = {pHHw∗(si = H, sj = H) + (1− pHH)w∗(si = H, sj = L))},
and
wLi = {pHHw∗(si = L, sj = H)) + (1− pHH)w∗(si = L, sj = L))}.
Proof:
Step 1: The rank payoff matrix corresponding to the optimal SD contract is:
H L
H ρ˜, ρ˜ ρˆ,−ρ′
L −ρ′, ρˆ ρ˜, ρ˜
To see this note that symmetry imposes the following structure on the rank payoff
matrix:
H L
H ρ˜, ρ˜ X, Y
L Y,X ρ˜, ρ˜
Correspondingly, with symmetric contracts Worker i’s incentives from status are
Ii(w) =
{
pHH (ρ˜− Y ) + (1− pHH) (X − ρ˜)} .
Clearly, choosing X ≤ Y is suboptimal because both I1, and I2 can be increased by
choosing X = ρˆ > Y = −ρ′. This completes the proof of the Claim. This implies
that wHL
∗
1 > w
HL∗
2 and w
LH∗
2 > w
LH∗
1 .
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Step 2: Observe that in a symmetric optimal SD contract wHH
∗
1 = w
HH∗
2 , w
HL∗
1 =
wLH
∗
2 w
LH∗
1 = w
HL∗
2 w
LL∗
1 = w
LL∗
2 . This implies that w
H
1 = w
H
2 and w
L
1 = w
L
2 .
Step 3: Now it is shown that an SI contract can be found that can achieve the
same EWC as the optimal SD contract. Given the construction of the independent
contract, it follows from Step 2 that wH1 = w
H
2 and w
L
1 = w
L
2 . Moreover since
wHL
∗
1 > w
HL∗
2 and w
LH∗
2 > w
LH∗
1 , it follows that w
H
1 > w
L
2 and w
H
2 > w
L
1 . Thus
the same rank payoff matrix is obtained as the one corresponding to the optimal
symmetric SD contract wSD
∗
.
Step 4: it has to be shown that the constructed wH1 , w
H
2 and w
L
1 , w
L
2 satisfy the
incentive constraints. Note that the incentive constraints are given by Equation (20).
The RHS of the incentive constraints is the same for the SD and the SI contract
(since the rank payoffs are the same). But this means that by construction the
incentive constraints are satisfied (since the LHS is also the same) and total costs
are the same.
It remains to show that the constructed wH1 , w
H
2 and w
L
1 , w
L
2 satisfy the (low) par-
ticipation constraints. Note that the participation constraints are given by Equa-
tion (17). The LHS of the participation constraint is the same for the SD and the SI
contract since the the expected utility from status is the same for both type of con-
tracts and wHi = p
HHwHH
∗
i + (1− pHH)wHL∗i and wLi = pHHwLH∗i + (1− pHH)wLL∗i .
For wm
∗
i to be the cost minimising optimal symmetric dependent contract ρ
′ has
to be sufficiently small such that the (low) participation constraint is fulfilled. In
the case of the SD contract as well as in the case of the SI contract a sufficient
condition for the LHS to be positive is ρ′ ≤ ρ′
S
. However when wm
∗
i fulfills the par-
ticipation constraint the symmetric independent contract wi fulfills the participation
constraint by construction, too.

From Proposition 6 together with Proposition 4 it follows immediately that with
symmetric dependent contracts it is not possible to achieve minimum expected wage
cost EWCmin. The following remark summerises this finding.
Remark: Let m ∈ SD and i = 1, 2. There exists no symmetric dependent contract
wSD, where
wSD = (w(si = H, sj = H), w(si = H, sj = L)), w(si = L, sj = H)), w(si = L, sj = L))
such that EWC
(
wSD
)
= EWCmin.
The above investigation established that the restrictions imposed by the assumption
of symmetry between the contracts is stronger than the freedom obtained from the
dependence of the contracts. As long as the firm has to offer both workers the
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same contracts it does not gain additional degrees of freedom by offering dependent
contracts instead of independent contracts.
How does the situation change when the firm has the possibility to over the most
general form of contracts, asymmetric dependent contracts? Does the firm gain
sufficient degrees of freedom in its choice of wage contracts to achieve minimum
expected wage cost EWCmin? Recall with asymmetric dependent wage contracts
the firm’s choice problem is
min
w
EWC =
∑
i
∑
m
[qmwmi ]
subject to the limited liability constraints
wmi ≥ 0.
with m ∈ SD, the incentive constraints (from Equation (20))[
E
(
wHi
)− E (wLi )] ≥ c¯∆pH − βIi(w)
and the (low effort) participation constraints (from Equation (17))
pLHE
(
wHi
)
+
(
1− pLH)E (wLi )+ βE (ρ(ri)|eL) ≥ 0.
Let
ρ′
1
=
(
(1− pHH) [pLH ρˆ+ (1− pLH)ρ˜]
pHH
)
and
ρ′
2
=
(
pLH
[
(1− pHH)ρˆ+ pHH ρ˜]
1− pLH
)
The optimal asymmetric (dependent) contract can now be characterised.
Theorem 3. Assume that
ρ′ ≤ min
[
ρ′
1
, ρ′
2
]
. (26)
(i) Suppose that preferences on status are convex: then there exists a dependent
contract that achieves the minimum expected cost, EWCmin, with an induced asym-
metric wage order:
wHH1 > w
HH
2 = 0; w
LH
2 > w
HL
1 > w
HL
2 = w
LH
1 = w
LL
1 = w
LL
2 = 0.
with
E(wH1 ) =
c
∆pH
− β(pHH(ρˆ+ ρ′) + (1− pHH)(ρˆ− ρ˜))
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and
E(wH2 ) =
c
∆pH
− β((1− pHH)(ρˆ− ρ˜)).
(ii) Suppose preferences on status are concave: then there exists a dependent contract
that achieves an expected wage cost that is  > 0 close to the EWCmin:
EWC = EWCmin +
(
1− pHH) ,
where  > 011 with an induced asymmetric wage order:
wHH1 = w
HH
2 ; w
LH
2 > w
LH
1 = 0; w
HL
1 > w
HL
2 = 0; w
LL
2 > w
LL
1 = 0
with
E(wH1 ) =
c
∆pH
− β(pHH(ρ˜+ ρ′) + (1− pHH)(ρˆ+ ρ′)),
E(wL2 ) =
(
1− pHH)wLL2 = (1− pHH) 
and
E(wH2 ) =
c
∆pH
− β(pHH(ρ˜+ ρ′)) + (1− pHH) ,
Proof: Suppose that preferences on status are convex. It is clear that (i) implements
the rank payoff matrix (B) (see proof of Lemma 4), since
wHH1 > w
HH
2 = 0; 0 = w
HL
2 < w
HL
1 ; 0 = w
LH
1 < w
LH
2 ;w
LL
1 = w
LL
2 = 0.
This implies 0 = E(wL1 ) = E(w
L
2 ). With the wages given, it has to be shown that the
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied: Indeed, both incentive constraints
are binding given that E(wLi ) = 0 and E(w
H
i ) =
c
∆pH
−βIi for i = 1, 2. Since I1 > I2
this implies that E(wH1 ) < E(w
H
2 ). This is satisfied by choosing w
LH
2 to satisfy(
1− pHH)wLH2 = E(wH2 ). The limited liability constraints for worker 1 are satisfied
if wHH1 , w
HL
1 > 0 and
c
∆pH
≥ β(pHH(ρˆ+ ρ′) + (1− pHH)(ρˆ− ρ˜)), but this is the case
since it has been assumed that c
∆pH
> β (ρˆ+ ρ′). Since E(wH2 ) > E(w
H
1 ) > 0 and
given the condition on wHH2 and w
LH
2 the limited liability constraints for worker 2
are satisfied, too. It remains to check that the participation constraints are satisfied.
The following condition is needed for the participation constraint (low effort) for
worker 1 to hold:
pLHE(wH1 ) +
(
1− pLH)E(wL1 ) + β[pLH (ρˆ) +(
1− pLH) (pHH(−ρ′) + (1− pHH)(ρ˜)) ] ≥ 0, (27)
11It is again assumed that  > 0 but equal to the smallest monetary unit to be able to fix the
optimal contract; otherwise there is always a smaller .
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Since pLHE(wH1 ) +
(
1− pLH)E(wL1 ) > 0 it is sufficient to check that
pLH (ρˆ) +
(
1− pLH) (pHH(−ρ′) + (1− pHH)(ρ˜)) ≥ 0.
Similarly for worker 2 the following condition is needed:
pLHE(wH2 )+
(
1− pLH)E(wL2 )+β [pHH (−ρ′) + (1− pHH) (pLH(ρˆ) + (1− pLH)(ρ˜))] ≥ 0,
(28)
Both of these are satisfied given the assumptions on ρ′ being sufficiently small. Note,
that if ρ′ is sufficiently small such that
pHH (−ρ′) + (1− pHH) (pLH(ρˆ) + (1− pLH)(ρ˜)) ≥ 0,
then worker 2’s and worker 1’s participation constraint are both fulfilled. In partic-
ular, if ρ′ = 0 the participation constraints are always satisfied.
(ii)
Suppose that preferences on status are concave. It is clear that (ii) implements the
rank payoff matrix (C) (see proof of Lemma 4), since
w = wHH1 = w
HH
2 ; 0 = w
HL
2 < w
HL
1 ; 0 = w
LH
1 < w
LH
2 ; 0 = w
LL
1 < w
LL
2 = .
This implies that 0 = E(wL1 ) < E(w
L
2 ) = (1− pHH). Also, with the wages given, it
is necessary to show that the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied: Note
that E(wL1 ) = 0, hence worker 1’s incentive constraint is binding. Since E(w
L
2 ) =
(1 − pHH), worker 2’s incentive constraint is also binding. Since I1 > I2 this
implies that E(wH1 ) < E(w
H
2 ). This is satisfied by the choice of w
LH
2 , such that
E(wH2 ) =
(
pHHw + (1− pHH)wLH2
)
and by the choice of wHL1 , such that E(w
H
1 ) =(
pHHw + (1− pHH)wHL1
)
for any w such that
0 ≤ w < E(w
H
1 )
pHH
.
The limited liability constraints are satisfied given the above conditions on wmi and
if c
∆pH
≥ β(pHH(ρ˜ + ρ′) + (1 − pHH)(ρˆ + ρ′)), but this is the case since it has been
assumed that c
∆pH
> β (ρˆ+ ρ′). Since E(wH2 ) > E(w
H
1 ) > 0 the limited liability
constraints for worker 2 are satisfied. It remains to check that the participation
constraints are satisfied.
The following condition is needed for the participation constraint of worker 1 to
hold:
pLHE(wH1 )+
(
1− pLH)E(wL1 )+β[pLH (pHH ρ˜+ (1− pHH)ρˆ)+(1− pLH) (−ρ′) ] ≥ 0,
(29)
40
Since pLHE(wH1 ) +
(
1− pLH)E(wL1 ) > 0 it is sufficient to check that
pLH
(
pHH ρ˜+
(
1− pHH) ρˆ)+ (1− pLH) (−ρ′) ≥ 0,
Similarly for worker 2 the following condition is needed:
pLHE(wH2 ) +
(
1− pLH)E(wL2 ) + β[pLH (pHH ρ˜+ (1− pHH) ρˆ) +(
1− pLH) (pHH(−ρ′) + (1− pHH)(ρˆ)) ] ≥ 0, (30)
Both of these are satisfied given the assumptions on ρ′ being sufficiently small. Note,
that if ρ′ is sufficiently small such that
pLH
(
pHH ρ˜+
(
1− pHH) ρˆ)+ (1− pLH) (−ρ′) ≥ 0,
then worker 1’s and worker 2’s participation constraint are both fulfilled. In partic-
ular, if ρ′ = 0 the participation constraints are always satisfied.

Which mechanism is at work in the case of asymmetric dependent contracts that
makes it possible to achieve minimum expected wage cost EWCmin and which is
missing in the case of symmetric dependent contracts? In the setup presented here
the main trade off is through the incentive constraints, because they are crucial
for the determination of the expected wage cost. Now with asymmetric dependent
contracts the incentives from status are higher for worker 1 and lower for worker 2
relative to the situation with the optimal symmetric contract.12 Denote the asym-
metric contract by AS and the symmetric one by S, then
I∗AS1 > I
∗S
1 = I
∗S
2 > I
∗AS
2 and E(w)
AS
2 > E(w)
S
1 = E(w)
S
2 > E(w)
AS
1 .
However, crucial for the firm’s decision to use asymmetric dependent contracts in-
stead of symmetric contracts is whether it can achieve lower expected wage cost with
asymmetric dependent than with symmetric contracts. To understand the intuition
for the results presented here it is useful to look at the status payoff matrix for a
symmetric contract:
H L
H ρ˜, ρ˜ ρˆ,−ρ′
L −ρ′, ρˆ ρ˜, ρ˜
12Recall that calling the agent with higher incentives agent 1 is without loss of generality since
the roles of the two workers can be exchanged.
41
By offering an asymmetric contract the firm can take advantage of the fact that
the changes in incentives (gain for one worker, loss for the other relative to the
symmetric contract) are not symmetric for the two workers. Indeed the gain in
incentives (relative to the symmetric contract) and hence the reduction in the ex-
pected wage cost for one worker must be larger than the loss in incentives (rela-
tive to the symmetric contract) and hence the increase in expected wage cost for
the other worker. Starting from the optimal symmetric contract there are two
states for which a switch to an asymmetric contract can cause a change in incen-
tives if the firm’s intention is to do so: the states when either both factories are
in the good state or when both factories are in the bad state. First look at the
case when both factories are in the good state. When preferences on status are
convex then the firm gains more by increasing worker 1’ incentives by increasing
his status payoff than it looses by reducing worker 2’s incentives by reducing his
status payoff in the situation when both factories are in the good state, because
worker 1’s gain in incentives is I∗AS1 − I∗S1 = pHH (ρˆ− ρ˜) and worker 2’s loss in
incentives is I∗AS2 − I∗S2 = −pHH (ρ˜+ ρ′). Second, looking at the case when both
factories are in the bad state, then when preferences on status are concave the
firm gains more by increasing worker 1’ incentives by decreasing his status payoff
than it looses by reducing worker 2’s incentives by increasing his status payoff in
the situation when both factories are in the good state, because worker 1’s gain in
incentives is I∗AS1 − I∗S1 =
(
1− pHH) (ρ˜+ ρ′) and worker 2’s loss in incentives is
I∗AS2 − I∗S2 = −
(
1− pHH) (ρˆ− ρ˜). Furthermore with asymmetric dependent con-
tracts in both cases wage profiles exist which translate these overall gains in incen-
tives into lower expected wage cost. If preferences on status would be linear, i.e.
ρˆ− ρ˜ = ρ˜+ ρ′, then asymmetry would not help and the optimal contract would be
the symmetric one. Also as shown above with asymmetric independent contracts
there are no wage profiles which can translate the overall gains in incentives into the
minimum expected wage cost EWCmin.
5 Concluding Remarks
Much of contract theory has focused on agents who are self interested. What hap-
pens to the theory of optimal contracts when this assumption is relaxed? In particu-
lar, what happens when workers care about their rank? This question is investigated
in a simple model with two status-seeking agents. The model used is the standard
moral hazard model used in the literature but with status seeking agents. It is shown
that then the problem of finding the optimal contract involves (1) maximising the
incentives from status given a particular distribution of the stochastic shocks to the
two workers: here essentially a game of status Shubik (1971) is designed to max-
imise the incentives of both workers. (2) Look for the levels of wages that minimise
expected wage costs and satisfy the Incentive Constraints.
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The main results are illustrated in a simple two agent model. If agents are not
too averse to being behind, it is shown that asymmetric contracts or discrimina-
tory contracts where the two agents are offered different contracts even though they
are ex-ante identical, are better than symmetric contracts in the case of observable
effort, when preferences on status are convex. In the case of unobservable effort,
asymmetric contracts dominate symmetric contracts, as long as the firm is allowed
to write down dependent contracts. If the firm is restricted to independent contracts
on the other hand, then it is shown that under some conditions, asymmetric indepen-
dent contracts are also better than symmetric contracts. Moreover, no symmetric
contract even if it is dependent can replicate the discriminatory one.
Intuitively, the results rely on the fact that there are enough states of nature that
any given agent can be both ahead in some states and behind or equal in others13.
Additionally the result relies on being able to pay one worker just a little bit more
than the other (the ). A criticism that might be leveled against this presentation
is that people perceive rank differences only when there are noticeable or significant
differences in wages (see e.g. Shubik (1971)) . There are two answers to this. First,
it is referred to anecdotal evidence from A. Oswald who cites the story of Professor X
who refused a job in a top university because he was paid a wage $ 10 below that of
the (then) highest paid professor. In other words, the satisfaction of being top ranked
comes from the fact that this hierarchy in wages is common knowledge. This is what
is assumed in the model presented here (contracts have to be common knowledge
to both workers). Second, what is suggested here (like Winter (2004)) is that there
may be benefits to introducing an artificial hierarchy between workers even when
the job is ex-ante identical – again it is the common knowledge about status that
is important rather than the actual wage differences. Indeed Baron (1988) suggests
that reference actors are people who are nor too different from oneself in terms of
pay. Pay differences matter more when they are across people in the same job title.
Is it better to have status seeking agents as far as the principal is concerned? Based
on this work it might be argued that the extra utility that agents get from rank
might cause the total expected wages paid out to be lower than in the case of agents
who are not status seeking (this is the wage compression result that is discussed by
many authors in this area (e.g. Frank (1984), Neilson and Stowe (2004)). When
symmetric contracts are compared with and without status seeking agents it turns
out that the wage compression result holds in the model presented here both with
observable effort and with unobservable effort. This is quite intuitive in that when
agents get some utility from rank (in the cases when the state is different across
workers), they need to be paid less to exert effort.
Finally this paper is concluded with some ideas for extensions of this work. One
13In this respect the result presented here parallels the observation in Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2004) that to maximize incentives to students from working some randomness must be introduced
in the payoffs from rank. However in the presented context the randomness is given as part of the
moral hazard set up and it is only possible to play with the ranks.
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obvious extension is to investigate the case of status seeking agents who are not
identical (adverse selection). Another interesting question is that of information
about wage scales. Why can it be observed e.g. that many organizations give broad
information about wages (i.e. the bands within which the wages for a given job title
lie) but not detailed information (e.g. which employee is getting how much). Is this
a case of making the reference group endogenous? How are these bands chosen? It
is hoped to tackle these questions in future work.
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